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Abstract—In intelligent transportation systems (ITS), commu-
nications between vehicles, i.e. vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) commu-
nications are of greatest importance to facilitate autonomous
driving. The current state-of-the-art for secure data exchange in
V2V communications relies on public-key cryptography (PKC)
consuming significant computational and energy resources for
the encryption/decryption process and large bandwidth for the
key distribution. To overcome these limitations, physical-layer
security (PLS) has emerged as a lightweight solution by exploiting
the physical characteristics of the V2V communication chan-
nel to generate symmetric cryptographic keys. Currently, key-
generation algorithms are designed via empirical parameter set-
tings, without resulting in optimum key-generation performance.
In this paper, we devise a key-generation algorithm for PLS in
V2V communications by introducing a novel channel response
quantisation method that results in optimum performance via
analytical parameter settings. Contrary to the current state-
of-the-art, the channel responses incorporate all V2V channel
attributes that contribute to temporal variability, such as three
dimensional (3D) scattering and scatterers’ mobility. An extra
functionality, namely, Perturbe-Observe (PO), is further incor-
porated that enables the algorithm to adapt to the inherent non-
reciprocity of the V2V channel responses at the legitimate entities.
Optimum performance is evidenced via maximisation of the key
bit generation rate (BGR) and key entropy (H) and minimisation
of the key bit mismatch rate (BMR). A new metric is further
introduced, the so-called secret-bit generation rate (SBGR), as
the ratio of the number of bits which are successfully used to
compose keys to the total amount of channel samples. SBGR
unifies BGR and BMR and is thus maximised by the proposed
algorithmic process.
Index Terms—Cryptographic key generation, Physical layer
security, Quantisation, Vehicular communications.
I. INTRODUCTION
INTELLIGENT transportation systems (ITS) is an emergingtechnology that will facilitate various services such as colli-
sion avoidance, traffic jam management, infotainment, etc., to
reduce transportation expenditure and enhance safety, security
and level of comfort [1]. Communications between vehicles,
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i.e. vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications and between ve-
hicles and roadside infrastructure, i.e. vehicle-to-infrastructure
(VI) communications constitute the backbone of ITS providing
connectivity between all communication entities. Security is
a top priority [2], [3] as the wireless medium opens up the
possibility for unauthorised users to passively eavesdrop or to
alter the transmissions [4]. Data confidentiality is traditionally
provided by cryptographic mechanisms implemented in upper
layers of the Open System Interconnection (OSI) model.
Encryption approaches can be classified into two categories:
symmetric (secret key) and asymmetric (public key) solutions
[5].
The current state-of-the-art relies on public-key cryptog-
raphy (PKC) to provide authentication, confidentiality, iden-
tity and non-repudiation. PKC primitives are computation-
ally complex and vehicles’ onboard units (OBUs) may still
need hundreds of milliseconds to complete such operations,
responsible for unacceptable delays when transmitting safety-
related messages [6]. Furthermore, PKC is intrinsically a
centralised approach, where a trusted authority distributes
and manages keys and certificates, thus, its adaptation to
highly distributed ad-hoc network raises scalability challenges
[7]. On the other hand, symmetric cryptography is more
computationally efficient than PKC but its applications are
drastically limited by the delicate tasks of distributing and
storing the secret keys. Distribution usually requires a secure
secondary channel which is hardly feasible, especially in
vehicular communication channels due to their rapid temporal
variability and short-time connections [8].
In these challenging scenarios, Physical Layer Security
(PLS) has emerged to provide unconditionally secure com-
munications by efficiently exploiting the wireless medium as
a shared source of randomness to extract symmetric keys [9].
PLS stems from the research of Wyner who demonstrated how
it is possible to establish secure transmissions in scenarios
where the eavesdropper (Eve) has a channel of lower quality
than the communicating nodes (Alice and Bob) [10]. This
difference of links’ quality translates into a difference of
channel capacities, referred to as secrecy capacity, which can
be exploited to send private information. Maurer [11] and
Ahlswede-Csiszar [12] demonstrated that confidentiality is
also achievable when the attacker observes a higher quality
link than the one available to authorised parties. This technique
is based on the extraction of a secret key over the public and
insecure channel.
Cryptographic keys are generated through the quantisation
of channel response features, which are considered random
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processes, such as the Received Signal Strength (RSS) or the
phase [13]. Randomness is a consequence of the unpredictabil-
ity of the multipath propagation and nodes’ mobility [14].
Nonetheless, successful key-generation is facilitated by the
channel reciprocity principle, which states that in sufficiently
small time-intervals, referred to as coherence time intervals,
the channel response is substantially constant [14], [15].
Thus, the communicating parties can probe the channel in an
interleaved fashion, obtaining similar estimates inside the same
coherence time intervals, generating the same keys. Channel
responses, obtained by illegitimate entities, are statistically
uncorrelated to the legitimate ones, due to spatial and temporal
variability of multipath propagation [14]. Thus, the generated
keys are dissimilar compared to those of the legitimate entities
and hence, communication data confidentiality is retained [5].
In the first phase of the key-extraction process, channel
responses at the legitimate entities are quantised, in order
to be converted to bit sequences [13]. This investigation
focuses on the RSS quantisation for its ease of use and the
immediate availability in all out-of-the-shelf wireless devices
[16]. Furthermore, RSS-based quantisation greatly benefits
from nodes’ mobility, which is the major attribute of V2V
communications, generating keys at a fast rate and with high
entropy.
In their study, Tope et al. analysed the signal attenuation by
collecting estimates of the envelope of received packets and
storing them into arrays [17]. Two thresholds were used to
drop estimates that have a high probability of being either fore-
seeable or converted to mismatching bits. In reference [18],
deep fades or local minima of the signal are used to improve
keys agreement. In this work, bitstreams are generated through
a single threshold set by an automatic gain control circuit
(AGC), to make it independent from the variability of signal
power. Reference [19] introduced a quantiser with two thresh-
olds, whose distance is proportional to the standard deviation
of RSS estimates. The quantisation bin between thresholds
is referred to as censor or invalid region, where values are
dropped because of their high probability of disagreement.
Furthermore, only the estimates located inside sequences of
sufficient excursions above or below the thresholds are con-
sidered to discard sharp changes in the RSS. In reference [20],
Adaptive Secret Bit Generation (ASBG) scheme refreshes the
quantisation thresholds after each block of channel estimates.
In its attempt to increase the bit generation, the scheme
introduced multiple quantisation levels which, however, are
severely limited by the noise and empirically set. Reference
[21] used over-quantisation as an error-correcting technique
for bit-disagreements. In fact, even if over-quantised bits are
independent of the regular ones, they still remain correlated to
legitimate parties. This amount of mutual information is then
used to reduce the length of syndromes, increasing the overall
generation rate. In [22], non-linear thresholds are used through
the creation of a least-square polynomial curve, whose degree
is empirically chosen according to the number of estimates and
Doppler shift. The existing quantisation methods are designed
through empirical settings of their parameters hence, they are
not optimum by design. Interested readers are referred to [13]
for a thorough survey on the performance and limitations of
current state-of-the-art quantisation techniques. In this paper,
we overcome this problem by using first and second order
statistics, specifically the Cumulative Distribution Function
(CDF) and the Average Fade Duration (AFD), in devising two
novel quantisation methods thus, realising equal probability
between 0s and 1s via analytical means.
The channel responses and hence the generated bit se-
quences at the legitimate entities are expected to be identical
due to the reciprocity principle of wireless communication
channels [14]. Hardware impairments, the noise inherent in
communication channels and mainly, the half-duplex nature of
the probing process causes discrepancies in the V2V channel
responses and generated bit sequences at the legitimate entities
[23]. All these effects are grouped into the term of imperfect
reciprocity. Only a few algorithms in literature take the im-
perfect reciprocity into account. Half-duplex limitations are
addressed in [24], [25] by applying fractional interpolation in
order to measure estimates at the same time instants virtually.
Moreover, non-reciprocity due to hardware differences is re-
moved through a ranking method in [26]. In other studies [27],
[28] non-reciprocity is simply ignored during quantisation
and adequately tackled with error correction. Furthermore, to
the best of our knowledge, there is no algorithm rigorously
adaptable to the randomly varying reciprocity. In this paper,
we compensate non-reciprocity component through the con-
tinuous adaptation of the quantisation thresholds.
Since a single different bit would make the generated keys
unusable, the quantisation stage is often followed by an in-
formation reconciliation phase that rectifies bit discrepancies.
A widely used technique is CASCADE in which parties ran-
domly permute the sequences and recursively exchange parity
check information [29]. More sophisticated schemes are based
on turbo codes [27] and low-density parity-check (LDPC) [28]
which both try to maximise reconciliation capabilities as well
as, simultaneously minimise the leakage of information to
the eavesdropper. Alice and Bob’s sequences should now be
identical; otherwise, the entire extraction process is restarted.
However, to use such strings as keys, the last step of privacy
amplification strengthens them by improving their entropy, for
example, with the application of universal hash functions or
one-way functions [30].
The performance of key-generation algorithms is quantified
via standardised key performance metrics, namely, the bit
generation rate (BGR), the bit mismatch rate (BMR) and the
key entropy (H) [31]. BGR is defined as the number of bits
that are generated per unit time or per channel sample. This
is directly related to quantisation, however, it also evaluates
the overall performance of the extraction process. In fact,
higher BGRs allow the creation of keys in less time and this is
crucial in low-latency V2V (safety) communications [32]. On
the other hand, BMR measures the disagreement between the
bit-streams obtained by the communicating parties. BMR is
commonly defined after the quantisation stage and it indicates
how the latter is susceptible to noise and imperfect reciprocity.
However, in this paper, BMR is considered after information
reconciliation to capture the performance of the complete key-
generation process. By doing so, a high BMR indicates that
the specific choice of quantisation parameters induces several
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mismatching bits that cannot be fully recovered by the chosen
information reconciliation scheme. Finally, the entropy (H) of
the extracted bit sequences measures their level of randomness
[33]. The latter is a crucial property of cryptographic keys to
remove possible statistical defects that could ease the attacks
conducted by adversaries with active or passive presence to
the channel [34].
What makes the design of key-generation algorithms chal-
lenging, is the conflicting relationship among the BGR, BMR
and H of the resulting bitstreams. In their attempt to optimise
the corresponding proposed schemes, most literature sources
address only a subset of the metrics introduced above, coming
up with sub-optimal results. BMR is the top priority metric
to be addressed since any unrecoverable disagreement could
lead to unusable keys [17], [18], [27]. In reference [17],
thresholds are used to remove both predictable and erroneous
bits, thus increasing entropy and decreasing BMR at the
expense of a lower BGR. In [18], deep fades reduce BMR
as well as BGR and H, further requiring the application of
a fuzzy extractor to keep the entropy to a sufficient level.
Moreover, all schemes try to improve the quantisation and
information reconciliation independently, without considering
their inner relationship. For example, reference [27] proposes a
turbo codes-based reconciliation, using the same quantisation
method initially proposed for the CASCADE protocol [29].
We address this challenge by introducing the novel metric
of Secret Bit Generation Rate (SBGR) that facilitates the
development of a thresholding optimisation algorithm, called
Perturb-Observe (PO).
Secret-key establishment in V2V has been studied in
[27], [35]–[40]. Reference [35] introduced two key-agreement
algorithms for vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-
infrastructure (V2I) modes, respectively. In the first algorithm,
quantisation is applied to the difference between two consec-
utive RSS values, instead of their absolute values. This way,
the scheme can provide better results in static or slow-moving
scenarios, while being resistant to RSS-manipulation attacks.
In the second algorithm, random channel hopping creates
the necessary frequency diversity, used to distribute secure
seeds among road-side units. Reference [36] introduced vector
quantisation to increase the bit generation. RSS estimates
are reused n times, where n is the dimension of the vector
and then sent to a fuzzy extractor, in order to achieve a
zero bit-disagreement rate. While this approach could achieve
better performances, it remains to investigate how estimates’
recycling could reduce key robustness. References [37], [38]
addressed two major challenges in extracting keys from vehic-
ular environments, namely, the very short coherence time and
the strong influence of noise. Both effects are addressed using
sliding window smoothing, whose weights are collaboratively
generated by Alice and Bob. V2V safety-related communica-
tions are delay-intolerant and require a reaction time of less
than 100 milliseconds. Such a constraint has been considered
in [39], where the authors designed a key-length optimisation
algorithm. This algorithm attempts to extract a key with as
much robustness as possible, starting from scenario’s char-
acteristics, such as parties’ locations and an estimate of the
coherence time. Reference [27] considers a parametric three-
dimensional wireless propagation model, including scattering
and scatterers’ mobility. In such an environment, the channel
non-reciprocity, which stems from channel noise and hardware
impairments, is addressed with the application of turbo-codes.
Results had demonstrated better key-generation rate and lower
error-probability, compared to existing methods. Reference
[40] analysed the feasibility of standard RSS-based algorithms
in a generic vehicular stochastic model, considering latency
and packet-size constraints. Even if the quantisation parame-
ters were optimised empirically, primary findings showed that
performances are still insufficient to support delay-intolerant
services.
To summarise, the existing RSS-based algorithms fail to
simultaneously optimise all the performance metrics (BGR,
BMR and H). They do not consider the specific information
reconciliation scheme in the choice of the quantisation parame-
ters. Furthermore, those parameters are empirically set without
taking into account the randomly varying non-reciprocity. To
fill these gaps, our contributions are summarised as follows:
1) We prove the existence of optimal thresholding for
the channel response employing a two-level, RSS-
based quantisation scheme. We originally aim at having
equiprobable 0s and 1s via analytical means. Accord-
ingly, we make use of the Cumulative Distribution
Function (CDF) and Average Fade Duration (AFD)
statistics to mathematically create equiprobable regions,
which in turn results in equiprobable 0s and 1s and
eventually bit sequences with maximum H. Although
the CDF has been employed in the past to partition
the quantisation space [13], however, we use CDF to
associate thresholds in order to dynamically generate
equiprobable quantisation bins by design (not based on
any empirical settings). The AFD is employed for the
first time in this paper to define thresholds, and proved
to outperform CDF-based thresholding in generated key
randomness.
2) We define a new metric, named as Secret-Bit Generation
Rate (SBGR) that accounts for the number of correct bits
per channel sample. It represents an efficient comparator
for different quantisation schemes, derived by consider-
ing both BMR and BGR. Besides, since we consider
BMR after the information reconciliation stage, SBGR
can evaluate quantisation performance as a function
of the capabilities of the information reconciliation. In
other words, SBGR allows for the adaptation of the pro-
posed PO algorithm to every information reconciliation
scheme.
3) We address the randomly varying non-reciprocity of the
channel with the introduction of a novel Perturb-Observe
(PO) algorithm. PO incorporates the Channel Gain Com-
plement (CGC) [41] to mitigate non-reciprocity, as ini-
tially proposed in [27]. Furthermore, it acts as feedback
in the key-extraction process, observing the SBGR per-
formance to adjust quantisation thresholds accordingly.
Thresholds can be continuously derived by the CDF and
AFD statistics, which become adaptable to the V2V
channel temporal variations, i.e. when CDF or ADF
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change. As a result, the proposed algorithm outperforms
the classical implementation of two-level quantisation
derived from the mean and standard deviation (hereafter
referred to as STD), as initially proposed in [19] and
further employed in various articles published previously
(among others [20], [27], [36], [39], [42], [43]). Table II
shows that the proposed approaches provide faster key-
generation rates (i.e., higher SBGR) than STD, while
maintaining optimal entropy H.
The remaining of this paper is organised as follows: Section
II presents the adopted V2V channel model and the key
performance metrics. Section III presents the new analytical-
based thresholding techniques and the proposed PO algorithm.
Section IV presents results and comparisons with the standard
thresholding technique STD [19]. Finally, Section V draws the
conclusion.
II. CHANNEL MODEL AND PERFORMANCE METRICS
We consider a highly-dense, non Line-of-Sight V2V com-
munication scenario. In this challenging scenario, the received
signal consists of the superposition of multipath components
via the interaction with surrounding scatterers [44]. Such
scatterers can be fixed and mobile (e.g. other vehicles) and
such interaction contributes to the temporal variability of
the V2V channel. Scatterers do not take part in the key-
generation process, but they constitute wireless propagation
mechanisms. Specifically, the impact of mobile scatterers is
further incorporated via the model presented in [45].
Although systematic threat modelling is outside of the scope
of this paper, however, we consider the malicious node Eve
is able to eavesdrop the V2V communication channel without
altering it. We also assume that Eve is located no less than half-
wavelength from Alice or Bob. In fact, at greater distances,
Eve perceives a statistically uncorrelated channel [46] thus,
greatly reducing the probability of extracting the same key as
the one used by legitimate parties.
A. V2V Stochastic Channel Model
To generate the most accurate synthetic data in our simu-
lations, we employ a generic parametric stochastic channel
model [44], which has proved to be applicable for key-
generation [27]. This model considers the wireless channel
response as a random process, the statistics of which provide
insight into the V2V channel attributes.
Fig. 1 shows the considered three-dimensional V2V sce-
nario, with propagation’s parameters and entities’ location.
Two vehicles, Alice and Bob, are equipped with a single
antenna and move at speeds uA(B) . Alice’s signals are
received by Bob as the superposition of a number L of
different echoes, unresolvable in delay. Each l-th multipath
component reaches its destination with a specific complex
amplitude al and phase  l caused by the different path it has
travelled. These multipath components interact with a fixed or
mobile scatterers [44].
Fig. 1. V2V channel model: two vehicles are moving in a 3D multipath
propagation environment including surrounding scatterers.





|al| exp(j l) exp(j2⇡vlt) (1)
where t is the time and vl the Doppler shift of the l-th
multipath component. The latter is the sum of the contributions
of the transmitter vA,l, receiver vB,l and scatterers vS,l, as
follows:








(cos↵1,l + cos↵2,l) (4)
where ↵A(B),l and  A(B),l are azimuth and elevation angles of
departure (arrival) and ↵1,l,↵2,l are the incoming and outgoing
angles at the mobile scatterer. Maximum Doppler shifts arise
from nodes’ mobility, having uA(B)max the maximum veloci-
ties,   the carrier’s wavelength at frequency fc and the speed
of light c. The speed of mobile scatterers uS is randomised
through a Weibull distribution with scale and shape parameters
w and a, respectively [44], [45]. Thus,
puS (uS) = wu
a 1
S exp( wuaS/a) (5)
Once we have Alice’s estimates we need to properly gen-
erate the corresponding Bob’s estimates in order to simulate
the effects of imperfect reciprocity realistically. This loss
of reciprocity is the direct consequence of slightly different
channel state information (CSI) sensed by legitimate parties.
In this study we mitigated the loss of reciprocity using the
Channel Gain Complement (CGC) method [41]. The following
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parameters are estimated during a learning phase of M probes














After subtracting µ from Alice’s and Bob’s time-domain
channel responses, non-reciprocity is compensated, however,
a zero-mean Gaussian distribution N(0, 2 2C) is still present
as the difference between channel responses. Thus [41]
GB(t) = GA(t) +N(0, 2 
2
C) (8)
The impact of the noisy component usually depends on the en-
vironmental conditions, which are dynamic and unpredictable,
especially in V2V communications. In this respect, our pro-
posed algorithm aims to rapidly adapt quantisation thresholds
to the available amount of channel non-reciprocity, modelled
via the standard deviation  C .
B. Key Performance Metrics
In order to compare the proposed algorithm to the other
schemes in the literature, it is necessary to introduce the
performance metrics [31]. The quantisation performance is
measured by the bit generation rate (BGR), which is the
average number of bits that can be extracted per channel
estimate or per unit time. The former definition is preferable,





Higher values of BGR indicate faster production of bit-
streams which, in turn, translate to keys being generated in
less time and hence refreshed continuously. Another relevant
performance criterion is the bit-mismatch rate (BMR) defined
as the ratio of the number of erroneous bits (i.e. they do not






BMR determines the algorithm’s resilience against noise
and interferences, defined after the quantisation stage or after
the information reconciliation. In the first case, BMR depends
only on how the quantisation space is modelled (as for exam-
ple, the number of thresholds). On the other hand, if BMR is
measured after information reconciliation, it accounts for the
bits that cannot be successfully recovered by the chosen error-
correcting approach. This way, BMR combines quantisation
and reconciliation, allowing a holistic optimisation.
To simultaneously optimise BMR and BGR, we define a
novel metric, namely the secret-bit generation rate (SBGR),
as the ratio of the number of bits which are successfully used






Since BMR is defined after information reconciliation, the
number of secret bits corresponds to the amount of success-
fully generated bits after information reconciliation, which can
be expressed as
no.secret bits = no.samples ·BGR · (1 BMR) (12)
By combining (11) and (12), we get
SBGR = BGR · (1 BMR) (13)
Eq. (13) showcases how the new metric SBGR combines BGR
and BMR. More specifically, SBGR is equal to BGR when all
bits are correct hence, BMR = 0. Considering that the extracted
sequences will be treated as cryptographic keys, it is important
they possess enough average entropy, ideally close to 1, to
maximise the uncertainty from an attacker’s point of view.
The entropy of bit i is measured by the following formula
[27]:
Hi =  p0,i log p0,i   (1  p0,i) log(1  p0,i) (14)
where p0,i is the posterior probability of bit i being 0. The
maximum value of 1 indicates the equal probability of having
bits 1 or 0, i.e. p1,i = 1   p0,i = 0.5. For independent
bit-strings of length N , the average entropy is defined as
Havg = (
PN
i=1 Hi)/N [47]. Though a classical metric, en-
tropy is not sufficient to prove the absence of statistical defects
in the bit sequences. For example, they may contain long
runs of the same bit and the repetition of sub-parts. For these
reasons, in all our tests, we also evaluate key robustness against
the random-tests suite, provided by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) [34].
III. ANALYTICAL THRESHOLDING
Our quantisation scheme departs from work introduced
in [19], where legitimate nodes locally convert their RSS-
estimates in bit-streams, prior to symmetric key generation.
Channel probing is done in half-duplex mode, hence Alice
and Bob extract samples from the same coherence intervals
in an interleaved fashion. The inability to probe at the same
time instants introduces a small, yet unpredictable variation in
the channel response [23]. The latter, together with other en-
vironmental factors, reduce the channel reciprocity as well as,
increase the probability of extracting different key-candidates
thus, they reduce the effectiveness of the extraction process.
In order to reduce BMR, we apply a two-level “censor”





1, if x > q+

















DATASIZE 50000 No. channel estimates
RUNS 120 No. test runs
L 20 No. multipaths components
uA(B)max 30 m/s (108 km/h) Transmitter (receiver) max speeds
uSmax 30 m/s (108 km/h) Scatterers’ max speed
↵A(B),l U [ ⇡,+⇡] Azimuth angles of departure (arrival)
 A(B),l U [0,⇡/3] Elevation angles of departure (arrival)
↵1,l,↵2,l U [ ⇡,+⇡] Scatterers’ incoming/outgoing angles
fc 6 GHz Carrier frequency
w 2.958 Weibull scale parameter
a 0.428 Weibull shape parameter
Estimates in the interval q   x  q+ are dropped in
accordance with their higher probability of being translated
into different bits at both communication ends. On the other
hand, the censor region has a direct impact of the performance
of the quantisation stage and its size should be set as the
optimal trade-off between BMR and BGR metrics. Authors
in [19] introduced a technique where thresholds were initially
computed using average and standard deviation of an array of
RSS samples h, thus
q± = average(h)± ↵STD · stdev(h) (16)
where parameter ↵STD accounts for the size of the censor
region and is calculated empirically. That technique has been
extensively employed in the published state-of-the-art [20],
[27], [36], [39], [42], [43]. Fig. 2 shows SBGR against
different invalid region sizes modelled through the parameter
↵STD in eq. (16) and for different non-reciprocity settings,
represented by the standard deviation  C in eq. (7). SBGR per-
formance increases as channel non-reciprocity ( C) reduces.
Simulation parameter setting is shown in Table I.
Given the fact that all curves in Fig. 2 express a single
(global) maximum, a Hill climbing algorithm seems to be
a simple yet effective approach to locate the point with the
highest performance [48, Ch. 7]. The idea is to “modulate” the
quantisation thresholds, according to the resulting SBGR, in an
attempt to identify the optimal set-point. However, as stated
in the introduction, a high entropy H of the generated bit-
streams is a mandatory requirement to guarantee the statistical
robustness of the resulting symmetric keys. As the definition
of SBGR does not ensure maximum entropy, we will relate the
thresholds to achieve maximum entropy via analytical means.
A. CDF-based Thresholding Strategy
The first proposed strategy is based on the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) FX(·). In the case of two-level
quantisation, optimal key-entropy is guaranteed by forcing
thresholds q± to generate equiprobable regions, thus
FX(q ) = Pr( 1 < x  q )
= Pr(q+  x < +1)
= 1  FX(q+)
(17)
In the absence of a line-of-sight (LOS) component, the
Rayleigh distribution is adopted as an example in this paper
[44]. Its CDF is defined as follows:





By combining eqs. (17) and (18) and after some algebraic














B. AFD-based thresholding strategy
The second proposed method is based on the use of average
fade duration (AFD), a second-order statistical parameter,
which could better capture channel temporal variability and
simultaneously maintain a sufficient level of key robustness.
AFD is defined as [49, pp 79-81]:
T (z) = FX(z)/N(z) (20)
that is the ratio between the cumulative distribution function
and the level crossing rate (LCR) N(·). In Rayleigh environ-












where parameter d1 depends on vehicles’ speeds and multipath
angular spread (see [44] for details). The core concept of using
AFD is to ensure that when a signal crosses a threshold, it will
remain in the corresponding region for the same (averaged)
time duration. Mathematically,
T (q ) = T
c(q+) (22)
where T c(z) = (1 FX(z))/N(z) is also commonly referred
to as connection time. Thus, we have from (20)
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Fig. 3. Thresholds optimisation block acts as a feedback in PLS key-
generation process.
Fig. 4. A simplified view of the optimisation block: reconciliation outcome

































Whenever it is needed to adapt the quantisation thresholds,
the two proposed strategies provide an analytical way to de-
rive the thresholds and invalid region’s boundaries, enforcing
maximum entropy as well as facilitating a novel optimisation
block using the SBGR metric.
C. Thresholding Optimisation
In this section we introduce an optimisation block in the
standard process of key extraction to realise the maximum
SBGR performance of the algorithm without relying on
the choice of fixed quantisation parameters. Fig. 3 shows
that the novel block acts as feedback from the information
reconciliation scheme to adapt the quantisation parameters
by continuously monitoring the output of the bit-extraction
process. Inside this block, a Perturb-Observe (PO) algorithm
constantly alters the invalid region size and monitors the
effects on the resulting SBGR. In doing so, PO can adapt
to different scenarios of channel non-reciprocity. For the sake
of simplicity, the algorithm perturbs the size of the censor
region by a positive amount   > 0, acting on the lower
threshold q  and leaving the corresponding upper threshold
q+ computed accordingly to the chosen strategy (CDF-based
or AFD-based). Fig. 4 shows the intuitive underlying idea: if
the generated bitstreams are different after reconciliation, this
indicates increased channel non-reciprocity ( C increases),
which should be balanced by a larger censor region. On the
other hand, matching keys suggest the possibility to reduce
thresholds’ distance further, thus, aiming for higher BGR.
The frequency with which the thresholds should be per-
turbed must be carefully chosen: if thresholds are modulated
too often, they can generate a significant oscillation around
the optimal SBGR, preventing complete convergence. On the
other hand, if the algorithm does not calibrate itself fast
enough, it may not be able to reach optimality before the
wireless channel has moved to a different non-reciprocity
condition. To strike a balance, it seems reasonable to perturb
quantisation bins after a minimum number of events. More
specifically, the algorithm waits for a number INTSUCCESS
of successful keys before reducing the censor size and a
number of INTFAIL failed attempts before increasing it.
Usually INTFAIL  INTSUCCESS because it is safer to
faster adapt to worse conditions than to improve already good
ones.
The PO algorithm reaches the highest SBGR point, where
perturbance should be stabilised in order to avoid changes
to the thresholds distance that can lead to bits discarded or
rejection of keys. For that reason, the algorithm simultaneously
quantifies the channel estimates against three pairs of thresh-















      (26)
Considering that eqs. (19) and (24) are monotonically
decreasing functions (see Appendix A), the three regions are
in the following order relation
(q(1)+   q
(1)









Recalling that smaller regions generate higher BGR as well
as higher BMR, we will refer to those pairs hereafter as ag-
gressive thresholds q(1)± , neutral thresholds q
(2)
± and defensive
thresholds q(3)± which will be further evaluated in this specific
order.
Fig. 5 shows the complete algorithm flowchart which can
be best explained by considering three possible conditions:
firstly, the algorithm is using a censor region’s size which is
larger than the optimal one for the current reciprocity factor.
In that case, it is highly probable that aggressive thresholds
q
(1)
± will be adequate to generate keys successfully. If this
condition is held for INTSUCCESS times, it is reasonable to
8
Fig. 5. Flowchart of PO algorithm where quantisation thresholds are adjusted
to achieve the maximum key-generation rate.
consider these thresholds as neutral, assigning q(2)  = q
(1)
  .
Secondly, when the algorithm reaches the maximum SBGR
and channel reciprocity is stable, it is more likely that neutral
thresholds q(2)± will be valid, leaving all parameters unchanged
as in the previous attempt, thus avoiding oscillations. Finally,
if we assume that the algorithm is using a smaller censor re-
gion concerning the current channel condition, only defensive
thresholds q(3)± are probably valid or else none, suggesting a
shift q(2)  = q
(3)
  after INTFAIL occurrences. Finally, q
(2)
  is
used to recalculate the other lower thresholds according to eqs.
(25), (26) and, hence, the corresponding upper ones through
eqs. (19), (24).








Fig. 6. CDF-thresholding strategy for different non-reciprocity factors.
IV. SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS
During the tests, simulations have been generated using
Monte Carlo technique [50], [51]. Every simulation included
50,000 channel estimates, repeated for 120 runs to stabilise
the resulting statistics. Furthermore, the number of multipath
components was L = 20 to recreate a purely diffuse Rayleigh
environment, capable of modelling an urban scenario. Since
estimates have to be collected from uncorrelated different
coherence region of duration Tcoh, we used a fixed maximum
probing rate Fp = 1/Tcoh where Tcoh = 1/vmax with
vmax = (uAmax +uBmax +2uSmax)/  the maximum Doppler
shift [44]. See Table I for the parameter settings.
In the first set of experiments, we evaluated the performance
of the new thresholding strategies. A standard two-level quan-
tisation scheme [19] with CASCADE has been modified to
analytically derive the thresholds using CDF and AFD-based
formulae presented in section III. Figs. 6 and 7 show SBGR
performances against censor size for different non-reciprocity
configurations modelled by the standard deviation  C . Results
are summarised in Table II, where both approaches outperform
STD in all scenarios, especially with worse reciprocity. Perfor-
mances are substantially equivalent, where CDF scores slightly
better results in correspondence to  C = 0.20 and  C = 0.30,
whilst AFD results superior in all other setups. According to
Eq. 11, SBGR expresses the number of bits which can be
extracted on average from each channel sample. Also, SBGR
counts the number of mutually agreeable bits between Alice
and Bob. These bits are candidates for the final key generated.
Table II also shows the number of keys (128-bits) which were
successfully generated using the full data-size of 50,000 probes
with each technique. The same Table also illustrates how both
analytical strategies are able to generate high entropy keys,
even in low reciprocity environments ( C = 0.30), where STD
fails to do so. Therefore, our approach outperforms the widely
employed STD quantisation technique.
In the second set of experiments, accuracy and performance
of the PO algorithm have been evaluated through extensive
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TABLE II
RESULTING SBGR, ENTROPY AND NUMBER OF 128-BIT KEYS OF STD, CDF AND AFD APPROACHES
 C STD CDF AFD
SBGR H Keys SBGR H Keys SBGR H Keys
0.10 0.5309 0.9935 207 0.5453 (+2.71%) 0.9947 213 0.5504 (+3.76%) 0.9941 215
0.15 0.4122 0.9933 161 0.4188 (+1.60%) 0.9937 164 0.4270 (+3.59%) 0.9941 167
0.20 0.2796 0.9934 109 0.3185 (+13.91%) 0.9940 124 0.3072 (+9.87%) 0.9932 120
0.25 0.1946 0.9934 76 0.2068 (+6.27%) 0.9939 81 0.2140 (+9.97%) 0.9925 84
0.30 0.1157 0.5252 45 0.1469 (+26.97%) 0.9942 57 0.1423 (+22.99%) 0.9920 56
TABLE III
RESULTS OF NIST TESTS ON THE PO ALGORITHM WITH CDF AND AFD THRESHOLDING STRATEGIES
Test (128-bit keys) PO-CDF PO-AFD
 C = 0.10  C = 0.20  C = 0.30  C = 0.10  C = 0.20  C = 0.30
monobit 0.7798 0.0736 0.0292 0.4338 0.8230 0.1312
frequency 0.7328 0.5190 0.0336 0.8197 0.9705 0.4008
runs 0.9982 0.9374 0.1211 0.8096 0.3412 0.8604
longest run ones 0.0610 0.6601 0.9287 0.4793 0.6442 0.7589
dft 0.3049 0.7975 0.3049 0.7975 0.4416 0.6079
non overlapping template matching 0.9996 0.9931 0.8218 0.9935 0.9373 0.5865
serial 0.4731 0.5528 0.0321 0.2649 0.5620 0.2867
approximate entropy 0.5468 0.5719 0.0326 0.6215 0.8187 0.2970
cumulative sums 0.8982 0.0471 0.0113 0.5492 0.7797 0.1075
random excursions 0.0158 0.0001 0.0018 0.0238 0.0957 0.0445
random excursions variant 0.0514 0.0005 0.1597 0.0593 0.0156 0.1991








Fig. 7. AFD-thresholding strategy for different non-reciprocity factors.
simulation. As the baseline, we introduced a quantisation
scheme, referred to as EX-SEARCH, where the thresholds
are chosen directly from a lookup table. The latter has been
created through an exhaustive search, containing the optimal
thresholds for various non-reciprocity settings in the range
 C 2 [0.10, 0.30]. Fig. 8 shows the PO algorithm’s perfor-
mance against EX-SEARCH. CDF and AFD configurations
provide similar results, however, they both outperform EX-
SEARCH, emphasising the superiority of our self-configurable
approach. Improvements have been made due to the PO’s
ability to adapt and exploit the time intervals, where the
random estimates temporally allow for a smaller censor-size
hence, a higher BGR.
In the last set of experiments, we applied the NIST test











Fig. 8. Performance of Perturb-Observe algorithm compared to exhaustive
search.
suite [34] to the bitstreams generated by our algorithm in
order to prove the absence of statistical defects. Each test
returns a P-value indicating the strength of the evidence
against the null hypothesis. More specifically, when the re-
turned P-value is larger than the chosen significance level
(↵sig = 0.01), the sequence can be considered as random.
Nonetheless, four tests, namely ‘Binary Matrix Rank’, ‘Over-
lapping Template Matching’, ‘Maurers Universal’ and ‘Linear
Complexity’, require extremely long streams, which cannot
be provided by this specific simulator and hence they were
excluded. Table 3 shows the P-values of the different tests for
different reciprocity conditions. CDF-based thresholding has
occasionally failed the ‘random excursions’ tests in case of low
channel reciprocity, whilst AFD-based thresholding proved to
be always successful. A possible explanation is that AFD,
being a second order channel statistic, can potentially capture
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better the channel temporal dynamics.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we derived new analytical formulas for the
quantisation thresholds in secret key extraction algorithms
using V2V channel responses in the time domain. We em-
ployed three-dimensional stochastic channel modelling, in-
cluding the impact of mobile scatterers. Advancing the current-
state-of-the-art, the proposed CDF- and AFD-based analytical
thresholding techniques guarantee entropy maximisation of
the resulting keys. With the aid of such techniques, we
introduced a quantisation optimisation block, named as PO
algorithm, as feedback in the key generation process to combat
non-reciprocity between the channel responses. The proposed
approach can be applied to any wireless propagation scenario,
although our focus was on V2V communications. Better over-
all performance was demonstrated via the induction of a new
metric, i.e., the SBGR. The proposed PO algorithm can adapt
to varying reciprocity conditions, which makes it unaffected
from empirical choices of parameters that do not secure
optimum performance. Robustness of the generated keys was
tested evaluating their respective Shannon entropies as well
as, against the NIST tests suite. In both cases, the resulting
bit sequences were proved sufficiently random. Through our
extensive simulations, the AFD-based thresholding strategy
has emerged as the suitable candidate for the generation of
high-quality high-diversity cryptographic keys, exploiting and
tracking the inherent time-domain randomness. Finally, part
of our current research activities seek to explore the efficacy
of additional information reconciliation schemes and their
impact upon the overall key generation performance, using
the proposed PO algorithm.
APPENDIX A









































Since all factors in both numerator and denominator are
positive for q  > 0 and   > 0, the first derivative is
always negative hence, f1(q ) and eq. (19) are monotonically
decreasing functions.
We now consider q+ = f2(q ) in eq. (24), having the








































where the denominator is always positive. Considering the













)   0 (30)












Setting q2 / 2 = x, x   0, we have
1
exp(x/2)
+ x   1 (32)
















We have g(0) = 1. Moreover, from eq. (33) the derivative
is always positive. Thus, g(x) is a monotonically increasing
function, verifying the validity of ineq. (32) which, in turn,
verifies ineq. (30). This makes f2(q ) and eq. (24) monoton-
ically decreasing functions.
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